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IMARES is:    
• an independent, objective and authoritative institute that provides knowledge necessary for an 
integrated sustainable protection, exploitation and spatial use of the sea and coastal zones; 
• an institute that provides knowledge necessary for an integrated sustainable protection, exploitation 
and spatial use of the sea and coastal zones; 
• a key, proactive player in national and international marine networks (including ICES and EFARO). 
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Summary 
 
The present report presents a summary of the content of the ex-post evaluation of the fishing agreement 
between the EU and Morocco (reference below), and does not necessarily reflect the views of IMARES: 
 
Framework Contract FISH/2006/20 : 
Convention spécifique n°26 : Evaluation ex-post du protocole actuel d’accord de partenariat dans le 
domaine de la pêche entre l’Union Européenne et le Royaume du Maroc, étude d’impact d’un possible 
future protocole d’accord. 
Rapport  
Décembre 2010 
 
1. Constitution of the report 
This report is made of 3 parts : 
The first one presents the general framework : geo-politic facts about Morocco, macro-economic 
situation (with a particular emphasis on the importance of the fisheries sector in the economy of the 
country), public policies and help for development . 
The second part deals specifically with the fisheries sector, describing the main management measures 
applicable in Morocco, the different fleets present and their catch, the state of fish stocks, the market of 
fish products, importance in terms of employment. 
The third part, dealing with the fishing agreement, presents the terms of the agreement, its socio-
economic consequences, the development of a partnership (policy, science, economy, control) and finally 
an evaluation of the agreements, in terms of achievements, of financial costs, relevance, and viability. 
2. Relevant facts about fisheries in Morocco 
 
Moroccan fleets:  
The Moroccan fleet is composed of 18 000 vessels representing a total of 1.2 KW of power (more than 
French and Spanish fishing fleets combined), made of 84% artisanal, 14% coastal and 2% industrial 
vessels (but respectively 10%, 40% and 50% in terms of cumulated gross tonnage).  
The industrial fleet is mainly composed of trawlers targeting either cephalopods or shrimps and freezing 
their catch. There are some trawlers targeting small pelagic fish.  
The coastal fleet is divided into long liners (demersal fish), demersal trawlers (demersal fish, 
cephalopods, shrimps), purse seiners (small pelagic fish) and polyvalent vessels. 
 
Catch of the Moroccan fleet : 
Morocco has caught 900 000t for a value of 710M€ in 2008 (86% from artisanal and coastal fleets and 
12% from industrial fleet). 
 
The foreign fleets in Morocco: 
-10 Russian pelagic trawlers allowed to fish 100 000t / year in the south of the country (little exploitation 
by national fleet in the south).  
- 18 Japanese tuna long liners are allowed to fish (but only 1 used that right) 
- the EU fleet is composed of about 80 vessels (but fluctuating from year to year). For instance the 
pelagic fleet varied between 0 and 9 vessels (which is still below the number of 18 vessels allowed by the 
agreement). Part of the EU pelagic fleet (Baltic countries and Poland) fish consecutively in Mauritania and 
Morocco , following the migration of the fish (horse mackerel and mackerel). 
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The catches of the EU fleets are on average of 44 000t, of which 94% is from industrial pelagic trawlers 
mostly taken in the southern part of the country (principally horse mackerel, mackerel and sardine). 
-around 30 foreign vessels are chartered by Moroccan companies to fish mainly small pelagic fish in the 
southern part of the country (either frozen or in refrigerated sea water). The amount of catch is around 
120 000t.  
 
Fisheries management : 
The fisheries in Morocco are primarily managed by a restriction of the access through the granting of 
fishing licences. Some species (the main one being octopus) are also managed using TACs (determined 
by the national fisheries institute) which are divided into quotas for each individual boat. A very modern 
and efficient system has been developed to follow in real time the amount of the catch landed by the 
fleets.  
Scientific research is done by the INRH (national fisheries research institute), employing 350 people, 
financed by subventions from the state and taxes on fishing licences (combined :11M€ per year). Part of 
the EU agreement money was used to increase INRH budget (by 20% or more in 2008-2010).  
 
Fisheries sector policy : 
A ambitious sectorial policy, based on the so-called halieutis strategy, has been implemented since 2009. 
With three objectives : i) sustainability in the fisheries, ii) optimising the fish market, iii) improving 
competitiveness. These three goals are to be achieved through 16 major projects. 
This policy is financed by national funds and by the international cooperation, of which the sectorial 
support envelop from the EU agreement is one element (but also USA and Japan). However it is 
estimated that by 2012, Morocco will be able to utilised less than half of amount of money paid by the EU 
for sectorial support. 
 
State of the stocks: 
The INRH is in charge the advice on fish stocks. Stock assessment is done by the INRH and also in 
CECAF working groups. 
Most of the stocks are either fully exploited (sardine, Atlantic mackerel, anchovy) or overexploited 
(sardinellas, horse mackerel, hake, octopus, shrimps). The only stock for which the catch could be 
increased in the sardine in the southern part of the country (which is shared with Mauritania), but which 
exploitation would generate catch on horse mackerel and mackerel already overexploited. Some adverse 
effects of fishing are the importance of discards, the catch of some endangered shark species (bottom 
long line) and of marine mammals (pelagic fisheries). 
 
3. Relevant points about the evaluation of the agreement 
 
The cost of the agreement is of 36M€ per year (of which 10M€ for the support to the sectorial policy). 
Besides that, it was expected that the fishing companies would pay on average 3.4M€ per year, but due 
to a lower than expected use of fishing possibilities, they paid only 1.9M€ . 
 
The fishing possibilities are : 
- 20 licences for artisanal seiners in the North (used at almost 100%) : corresponds to a need of 
andalucian seiners to continue fishing when the fishery is closed in the gulf of Cadiz. 
- 30 licences for artisanal fishing vessels in the North (used at almost 100%) : for the Spanish it is close 
to their normal fishing grounds, for the Portuguese it represents a productive fishery, but the cost of the 
licences is considered to be too high.  
- 20 licences for artisanal fishing vessels in the south (used at a rate decreasing from 80% to 50% 
between 2007 and 2009), the fishery becomes less attractive to vessels from the Canary Islands 
(increasing fuel price and decreasing fish price). 
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- 22 licences for industrial demersal fishing vessels in the south (long line and trawlers). Hardly used 
because too restrictive in term of vessel size and not interesting in term of potential catch (fishing 
allowed only below the 200m depth line) . 
- 27 licences for tuna (used at a rate decreasing from 90% to 60% between 2007 and 2009) mainly by 
Spanish hand line fishing vessels, which number has decreased due to the restriction on blue fin tuna 
fishing. 
- 10 licences for small pelagic fish in the south of which 1/3 for the Netherlands (variable rate of use , 
between 50 and 100%). There is a limitation of the catch at 60 000t/year. The Baltic countries and to a 
lesser extend Poland and the UK have been the most active in this fishery. The Netherlands (1 vessel) 
have fished only in 2009 (about 30% of the quota). NB : the access to Moroccan waters for this vessels 
has been forbidden after that the transmission of VMS position was interrupted (intentional or 
accidental?) ; this vessels was anyway not welcome in the EEZ due to its very large size (>140m : 
Annelies Illena). The limited rate of use of the fishing possibilities was due to already planned fishing –
strategies for this fleet when the agreement started (2007) and difficulties to exchange quotas between 
countries. There is a waste of fishing opportunities due to these planning problems and some companies 
(UK) found it easier to flag ship their vessels and fish in Morocco under charter agreements.  
 
Compliance with the agreement : 
The EU fleet has respected the agreement in terms of employment of Moroccan fishermen, but the lists 
of the seamen employed were not transmitted to the Moroccan authorities. 
However, the clause of the agreement on the percentage of the catch to be landed in Morocco was not 
respected by the European fleet, mostly because of a lack of appropriate landing facilities. However, the 
volume of the catch by the EU fleet is not substantial compared to the volume of the Moroccan catch, 
and the non-compliance with this obligation has very little influence on the inshore fisheries sector 
industry in Morocco. 
Furthermore, there are some deficiencies in the declaration of the catch (declared too late, or declaration 
lower that the landings). 
Finally, it is reported that the pelagic fleet in some cases postponed their payments to the end of the 
fishing season (while they should be done before) or even didn’t pay (EU fishing companies still owe 1M€ 
to Morocco). 
 
Employment 
The agreement contributed to the employment of 780 people (80% from Andalucia, Canary Islands  in 
Spain and Algarve in Portugal) on the EU side and of 170 people in Morocco.  
 
Partnership : 
The partnership didn’t work well. In term of development /implementation of the sectorial policy, there 
was very little consultation from the Moroccan authorities to the EU (except for monitoring the 
expenses).  
The scientific partnership, via the Joint scientific committee (meeting twice) did provide a platform for 
discussion on on-going projects and on the effort needed on specific topics, but with no added value in 
terms of stock assessment (as for Mauritania, overlap with the CECAF prerogatives). 
The partnership for the promotion of European investments did not give any result. 
 
Post ex evaluation of the agreements :  
 
Was this agreement successful in terms of realisations ? 
Globally disappointing : a positive side is the presence of 80 EU vessels fishing in Morocco, for most of 
them (Spanish and Portuguese) traditionally fishing in adjacent fishing grounds. But the volume of the 
catch under the agreement is relatively limited, and mostly composed of pelagic fish, which are not sold 
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on the EU market. Therefore the agreement did not contribute to improve the situation of the sea food 
market in the EU. The agreement did not help to develop substantially the fisheries sector in Morocco 
(low volume of the landings generated, number of seamen employed marginal compared to the 
Moroccan fleet). Finally, the partnership EU-Morocco for the implementation of a policy for the fisheries 
sector was very limited, and the envelope for the sectorial policy support was not entirely spent (even 
though providing a valuable complement to the INRH budget). 
 
Was this agreement successful in financial terms ? 
Very high cost for these few results. The ratio benefits/cost for this agreement is the lowest of the all 
existing fisheries agreements involving the EU, mostly because the fishing possibilities were not 
completely used. The same results could have been reached at a lower cost if the agreement were made 
on more limited fishing possibilities for the EU fleet (only for the under-used categories). 
 
Was this agreement relevant ? 
For the EU : except for the category 4 (demersal trawlers), the agreement was relevant since it allowed 
an extension to the south of the traditional fishing grounds and contributed to release the fishing 
pressure on EU stocks (mainly for Southern Spain, Canary islands and Portugal).  
For Morocco, it seems that this agreement is not very interesting : i) most of fish stocks are already fully 
or over exploited, therefore there wasn’t really a need to introduce a foreign fleet to exploit their 
resources, and ii) the financial contribution of the agreement is negligible in the state’s budget (unlike for 
Mauritania or Guinea) and the envelop for sectorial policy support was only partially used (due to 
technical constraints). 
Only in the case of small pelagic fish there was some need to give an access to a foreign fleet (especially 
for Sardine in the south which is underexploited). But this could be done (and was done previously) 
without any bilateral agreement, but under charter arrangements. 
 
Viability of the agreement 
The agreement contribute to the viability of some EU fleets (and the associate industry inshore). There is 
no substantial impact on the Moroccan fishing sector, and it results in a slight increase in fishing pressure 
on Moroccan fish stocks which are already overexploited. 
 
4. Conclusion: 
 
The report concludes that the only positive point of the agreement is that it gives fishing possibilities for 
50 vessels which really needed it to continue their activity (Southern Spain and Portugal). Otherwise the 
results of the agreement were disappointing compared to their cost. 
The next agreement needs to better adjust the fishing possibilities negotiated to the needs of the EU 
fleets (to avoid low utilisation rates) and give more flexibility in the way the envelop for the sectorial 
policy support can be used by Morocco (to avoid its under-use). 
This type of fishing agreement seems to be more adapted for developing countries such as Mauritania 
than for Morocco whose fisheries sector industry and the sectorial policy are further advanced. But on the 
other hand this agreement provides a discussion framework between EU and Morocco which have already 
well developed interactions in sectors other than the fisheries. 
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Justification 
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